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NOTES
A  DUAL  SYSTEM  OF  JUSTICE:  FINANCIAL




In 2013, Deutsche Bank established a relationship with Jeffrey Epstein
that was estimated to generate revenues of up to $4 million a year.1  Seven
years later, as a result of its dealings with Mr. Epstein, Deutsche Bank agreed
to pay a fine of $150 million.2  New York state regulators accused the bank of
allowing “significant compliance failures” when processing hundreds of
transactions for the late financier.3  Throughout the relationship, regulators
asserted that the bank had not properly addressed a plethora of red flags: Mr.
Epstein’s controversial past and criminal history of sexual misconduct, 120
wire transfers totaling $2.65 million to women with Eastern European sur-
names, suspicious payments to past coconspirators,4 and suspiciously large
cash withdrawals, including a cash withdrawal of $100,000 for “tips and
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2022; Bachelor of Business
Administration in Accounting and Finance, St. Bonaventure University, 2016.  I would like
to thank Professor Jimmy Gurulé for his guidance, Maria Ianni for her feedback and never-
ending support, and my friends on the Notre Dame Law Review for their diligent editing and
unparalleled commitment to excellence.  Finally, I would like to thank my parents, family,
and friends for their boundless love and encouragement.  All remaining errors are mine
alone.
1 James B. Stewart, These Are the Deutsche Bank Executives Responsible for Serving Jeffrey
Epstein, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3eroVqg.
2 Deutsche Bank Faces $150m Fine for Jeffrey Epstein Ties, BBC NEWS (July 7, 2020), https:/
/www.bbc.com/news/business-53324888.
3 Id.
4 Id.; see also Matthew Goldstein, Deutsche Bank Settles over Ignored Red Flags on Jeffrey
Epstein, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3cDwOdy.  Outgoing payments were
sent “to three people who had been named as co-conspirators in suits by Mr. Epstein’s
accusers that were related to his 2008 guilty plea to prostitution charges in Florida.” Id.
2007
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household expenses.”5  Regulators identified a number of control failures
that allowed for Mr. Epstein’s assets to be used for criminal misconduct.  For
example, when setting conditions for monitoring Epstein’s activity, bank
executives poorly communicated the criteria for flagging suspicious transac-
tions, creating confusion within the internal anti–money laundering divi-
sion.6  As a result, “specialists interpreted the guidance to mean that unusual
activity should be flagged only if it was unusual for Mr. Epstein—which led to
an alert about payments to a Russian model and a Russian publicity agent
being dismissed because the transactions were ‘normal for this client.’”7
At first, one might think that such a hefty fine of $150 million would
induce Deutsche Bank to correct these failures.  Yet, perhaps surprisingly,
such fines are not uncommon for the bank.8  Deutsche Bank, “a symbol of
corporate recidivism[,] . . . has paid more than $9 billion in fines since 2008
related to a litany of alleged and admitted financial crimes.”9  In 2016 alone,
Deutsche Bank was involved in 7800 different legal disputes, with an esti-
5 See Goldstein, supra note 4.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 There is some nuance worth noting upfront when discussing the blameworthiness
of corporations for repeated misconduct.  Deutsche Bank, the eighth-largest investment
bank globally with over 87,000 employees worldwide, is an organization with incredibly
complex business structures and supervisory relationships.  F. Norrestad, Deutsche Bank –
Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.statista.com/topics/1350/deutsche-
bank/; F. Norrestad, Number of Employees at Deutsche Bank Worldwide from 2006 to 2019,
STATISTA (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/262691/number-of-employ-
ees-at-deutsche-bank-since-2006/.  While it is easy to look at “Deutsche Bank” as one singu-
lar unit responsible for all of its business dealings, proper or otherwise, such behavior can
be driven by decisions made in disassociated or rogue business units anywhere around the
world.  Is it truly fair to hold one person, or more specifically a small group of people in
charge of a corporation, responsible for all such decisions?  Moral philosophers consider
similar questions in IBO VAN DE POEL, LAMBÈR ROYAKKERS & SJOERD D. ZWART, MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE PROBLEM OF MANY HANDS 4 (2015) (“A problem of many hands
occurs if there is a gap in a responsibility distribution in a collective setting that is morally
problematic.” (quoting Ibo van de Poel, Jessica Nihlén Fahlquist, Neelke Doorn, Sjoerd
Zwart & Lambér Royakkers, The Problem of Many Hands: Climate Change as an Example, 18
SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 49, 63 (2012))).  In terms of corporate accountability,
“[u]nderstanding the problem of group responsibility should incentivize companies to
have clearer lines of power and communication.”  Olivia Goldhill, When a Company Does
Something Wrong, How Should We Decide Who to Blame?, QUARTZ (Dec. 13, 2015), https://
qz.com/572723/when-companies-do-terrible-things-who-should-get-the-blame/.  Assigning
responsibility in such cases can “help give justice to the victims,” “deter individuals from
behaving the same way again,” and help “determine the rules and expectations we have for
all groups in society.” Id.
9 Stewart, supra note 1 (“[Deutsche Bank] has paid more than $9 billion in fines since
2008 related to . . . manipulating interest rates, failing to prevent money laundering, evad-
ing sanctions on Iran and other countries and engaging in fraud in the run-up to the
financial crisis.”).
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mated litigation reserve of $5.7 billion.10  Since the relationship between
Deutsche Bank and Mr. Epstein began in 2013, the bank agreed to pay the
following: $2.5 billion in fines for its involvement in the 2002 LIBOR scan-
dal;11 $7.2 billion in a settlement over its role in the 2008 financial crisis;12
$258 million for doing business with Libya, Myanmar, Sudan, Iran, and Syria
in violation of U.S. economic sanctions;13 $425 million for its role in launder-
ing $10 billion out of Russia;14 and $7.5 million to settle charges of improp-
erly handling “pre-released” American depository receipts.15
The relationship between Deutsche Bank and Jeffrey Epstein exempli-
fies a pattern as old as white-collar crime itself, in which an organization
found to have violated the rules designed to protect the public agrees to pay
a considerable fine for its wrongdoing.  However, Deutsche Bank, like almost
all large international banks, is a public corporation.  This means that when
these fines are levied against the bank, the burden ultimately falls on the
corporation’s public shareholders, rather than falling on the individuals
responsible for breaking the law.  As of June 30, 2020, the approximate date
10 Deutsche Bank: Zwischen Ramsch und Skandalen [Deutsche Bank: Between Junk and Scan-
dals] (Ger.), ARD (May 24, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web/20170404093959/http://
boerse.ard.de/aktien/deutsche-bank-zwischen-ramsch-und-skandalen100.html.  The litiga-
tion reserve of C= 5.4 billion converts to approximately $5.7 billion using the average con-
version rate as of December 31, 2016. See Euro Exchange Rates for 31/12/2016, EXCHANGE
RATES, https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/historical/EUR/31_12_2016 (last visited Mar.
19, 2021).
11 See Ben Protess & Jack Ewing, Deutsche Bank to Pay $2.5 Billion Fine to Settle Rate-
Rigging Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015), https://nyti.ms/3bYeqgi.  The LIBOR scandal
involved sixteen financial institutions colluding to manipulate the interbank lending rate.
See generally James McBride, Understanding the Libor Scandal, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/understanding-libor-scandal;
Andrew Bailey, Chief Executive of the Financial Conduct Authority, Speech at Bloomberg
London (July 27, 2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/the-future-of-libor (ques-
tioning the future of LIBOR and the effect it will have on the financial market).  Banks
colluded to create an artificially low rate, which allowed the bank to appear less risky to
investors. See generally Bailey, supra.
12 See Karen Freifeld, Arno Schuetze & Kathrin Jones, Deutsche Bank Agrees to $7.2 Bil-
lion Mortgage Settlement with U.S., REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2016), https://reut.rs/3s2ds8y (“As part
of the agreement, Deutsche Bank would pay a civil monetary penalty of $3.1 billion and
provide $4.1 billion in consumer relief, such as loan forgiveness.”).
13 See Deutsche Bank to Pay US$258m for Violating US Sanctions, BUS. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015)
https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/banking-finance/deutsche-bank-to-pay-us258m-for-vio-
lating-us-sanctions.  Like the Epstein fine, this fine was imposed by the New York State
Department of Financial Services. Id.
14 See Landon Thomas Jr., Deutsche Bank Fined in Plan to Help Russians Launder $10
Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2Qbr1UR; Christine Wang, Deutsche
Bank to Pay $425 Million Fine over Russian Money-Laundering Scheme: New York Regulator,
CNBC (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/30/deutsche-bank-to-pay-425-mil-
lion-fine-over-russian-money-laundering.html.
15 See Press Release, SEC, Deutsche Bank to Pay Nearly $75 Million for Improper Han-
dling of ADRs (July 20, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-138.
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of the Epstein fine, Deutsche Bank had 2.11 billion outstanding shares.16
Therefore, the $150 million fine imposed on the bank had the ultimate
effect of fining each individual shareholder just over seven cents.
However, it is not corporations that commit crimes, it is people.17  Jim
Stewart, a lawyer and New York Times columnist, argued that, “Individuals do
the bad things.  The shareholders didn’t do it, and the bank, in the abstract,
didn’t do it.  So I’m all for punishing the people who did it and holding them
accountable.”18  Yet, while the fining of corporations is well publicized and
often makes front-page news, the individuals who committed the acts behind
the fine are rarely held personally accountable.
It is rare for companies and regulators that are settling allegations of crimes
or other misconduct to name the individuals responsible for those mis-
deeds—a practice that perpetuates the myth that such acts were inadver-
tently committed by a faceless institution and were not the consequence of
decisions made by human beings.19
The impact of distributing the burden of the fines to the shareholders, rather
than the individual actors, is clear.  “When those individuals bear no discerni-
ble consequences, the result is an astonishing rate of recidivism.”20  Deutsche
Bank is not alone.  White-collar crime permeates the financial sector and, as
a result, places an immense cost on society.
Using the anecdotal example of Deutsche Bank, it is clear that the cur-
rent scheme of white-collar enforcement is not effective in deterring white-
collar criminal activity.  This Note will go on to show that Deutsche Bank is
not an anomaly.  The government’s current approach to white-collar crimi-
nal enforcement fails to meet any of the following traditional principles of
punishment: specific and general deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation,
or retributivism.  An analysis of white-collar enforcement shows a “story of
how the most powerful banks in the world are doing business with the worst
16 DEUTSCHE BANK, INTERIM REPORT AS OF JUNE 30, 2020, at 98 (2020).
17 For an in-depth discussion of the criminal behavior and responsibility of corpora-
tions, see Eliezer Lederman, Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporation: Rethinking a Complex
Triangle, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 285 (1985).
18 New York Times’ Jim Stewart on Wells Fargo’s Latest Punishment, CNBC (Apr. 20, 2018),
https://cnb.cx/3bWRuOH.  In this quote, Jim Stewart specifically refers to the $185 mil-
lion fine Wells Fargo received when it was found responsible for opening fake accounts for
customers to boost sales projections. Id.  Ultimately, Wells Fargo agreed to pay a total of $3
billion to settle criminal charges and a civil action as a result of committing blatant “fraud”
when they “opened millions of accounts in customers’ names without their knowledge,
signed unwitting account holders up for credit cards and bill payment programs, created
fake personal identification numbers, forged signatures and even secretly transferred cus-
tomers’ money.”  Emily Flitter, The Price of Wells Fargo’s Fake Account Scandal Grows by $3
Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2ufUrXk.  Including this fine, Wells
Fargo had paid a total of over $18 billion in fines in the previous twelve years. Id.
19 Stewart, supra note 1.
20 Id.
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of humanity, helping them move their money around the globe and making
a tidy profit for themselves and their shareholders.”21
Proposing more severe punishment for white-collar criminals is not a
new concept.  While many argue for the increased prison time of white-collar
offenders, others provide “a counter-perspective on the use of prison
sentences.”22  Other areas of academic publication support the convergence
of sentencing guidelines for white-collar and drug-related criminals, particu-
larly in light of utilitarian and retributivist principles.23  Rather than simply
recommending that white-collar criminals should be punished more, this
Note proposes two distinct structural solutions that reevaluate the current
policies directing the punishment of white-collar criminal conduct.  Specifi-
cally, this Note argues that the Department of Justice (DOJ) should recon-
sider the practice of levying large fines against corporate entities that,
through their public structure, pass the fines on to innocent shareholders.
After evaluating how and why the current approaches to the enforce-
ment of white-collar laws are insufficient and fail to meet the fundamental
principles of punishment, this Note proposes two solutions.  First, FinCEN,
the government organization tasked with combatting financial crimes and
money laundering, should develop a more thorough and holistic approach
to the reporting requirements of financial institutions.  Second, judges
should become more involved in the approval of Deferred Prosecution
Agreements (DPAs).  Rather than viewing DPAs as only bilateral agreements
between prosecutors and defendants, judges should serve as the representa-
tives of public interest, similar to their role in plea agreements.  These two
proposals would strengthen the overall response to corporate white-collar
crime by deterring future criminal activity.
21 Episode One: The Documents, Suspicious Activity: Inside the FinCEN Files, PINEAPPLE
STREET STUDIOS (Sept. 20, 2020), https://apple.co/3lsIi7J (quote from Anthony Cormier,
reporter at BuzzFeed News).
22 Elizabeth Szockyj, Imprisoning White-Collar Criminals?, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 485, 485
(1999) (recommending the use of intermediate and informal sanctions in lieu of prison
sentences); see also Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 409, 410–11 (1980) (“[T]he social benefits of punishment are no greater
when punishment takes the form of imprisonment than when it takes the form of a fine.”).
23 Carl Emigholz, Note, Utilitarianism, Retributivism and the White Collar-Drug Crime Sen-
tencing Disparity: Toward a Unified Theory of Enforcement, 58 RUTGERS L. REV 583, 584 (2006)
(“[I]f utilitarian and retributivist principles are applied to sentencing of [white-collar and
drug] crimes, they should conform to similar models of enforcement.”). But see Ilene H.
Nagel & John L. Hagan, The Sentencing of White-Collar Criminals in Federal Courts: A Socio-
Legal Exploration of Disparity, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1427, 1455–56 (1982) (arguing that empirical
evidence does not clearly support the public perception that white-collar criminals are
treated disparately as opposed to other types of criminals).
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I. THE EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT SOCIETAL COSTS OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME
A. The Severity of White-Collar Crime
Georgie Weatherby, a professor of sociology and criminology at Gonzaga
University, claims that the public has a serious misconception about the seri-
ousness of white-collar crime.24  The root of the misconception is that people
do not feel the costs of white-collar crime directly, even though the overarch-
ing cost to society is immense.  “How safe [people] feel in their homes, where
they can walk at night, these are the issues people feel.  They are tangible.”25
White-collar crime does not impact society in such a tangible way.  However,
not only are the societal costs of white-collar crime severe, but they also have
been increasing in recent years.26  “[O]ver the course of two years in the
early [twenty-first] century, annual losses from fraudulent use of identity rose
by more than $300 million in the United States.”27  Based on FBI estimates,
white-collar crime costs the U.S. economy over $300 billion every year, caus-
ing significant negative impacts on people’s lives.28
For example, consider the effects of one type of white-collar crime:
health care fraud.  One of the most widespread types of health care fraud is
overbilling or “upcoding,” where providers change “a patient’s diagnosis or
treatment code to one reimbursed at a higher level.”29  Other types of health
care fraud include providing unnecessary services or billing for “phantom”
services not rendered.30  Not only are the people with tax dollars supporting
state Medicare and Medicaid programs victims of such crimes, but also those
who pay for health insurance, whether privately or through an employer.
Premiums charged by insurance companies directly correlate with the
expenses and bills that they are responsible for paying.  As fraudulent bills
increase, insurance companies charge higher premiums.  “Employers, both
those that are self-insured and those that buy private insurance, see their
health care costs increase every year due to fraud and abuse—and every year
24 George Pierpoint, Is White-Collar Crime Treated More Leniently in the US?, BBC NEWS
(Mar. 11, 2019), https://bbc.in/3s00Yhs.
25 Id.
26 See Laurie L. Levenson, Cost to Society, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
topic/white-collar-crime/Cost-to-society (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).
27 Id. But see Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate and White Collar Crime: Simplifying the Ambiguous,
31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391, 392 (1994) (“I am uncertain whether [white-collar] crime has
actually increased or perhaps the informational basis for detecting crime has reached a
level of sophistication that permits us to see that which we were unable to see before.”).
28 See Inside the FBI, Health Care Fraud Costs Billions, FBI (June 12, 2009) [hereinafter
Health Care Fraud], https://www.fbi.gov/audio-repository/news-podcasts-inside-health-
care-fraud-costs-billions.mp3/view (recording an interview of FBI Special Agent Rob
Montemorra, Chief of the FBI Health Care Fraud Unit).
29 A Bill to Provide Enhanced Penalties for Commission of Fraud in Connection with the Provi-
sion of or Receipt of Payment for Health Care Services, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on S. 2652
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 99 (1992) (emphasis omitted) (statement of
the American Association of Retired Persons).
30 Id. at 99–101.
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they pass the costs onto consumers in the form of higher prices and lower
wages.”31  Individual workers eventually see their health care premiums rise,
and their health care benefits decline.32  It has been estimated that the costs
of fraud and abuse range from three to ten percent of national health care
spending, which have the “potential to become incredibly large because [of]
the trickle-down effect” of those costs to the public.33
Contrary to some public perception, white-collar crime is not vic-
timless.34  A single instance of white-collar criminal activity “can destroy a
company, devastate families by wiping out their life savings, or cost investors
billions of dollars.”35  Some instances, like the collapse of Enron, which
resulted in over 4500 lost jobs and over $1 billion in investment losses, can
even accomplish all three.36  Slowly, however, the public’s perception of
white-collar crime is changing.  “Although white-collar crime has traditionally
been viewed as less serious than other types of crime . . . there [has been] a
growing recognition of the significant harm it causes.”37  In recognition of
that harm, courts awarded nearly $500 million in restitution to victims of
white-collar crimes in a single year.38
B. Misaligned Incentives
When evaluating the conduct of those who commit white-collar offenses,
it is essential to consider the current enforcement scheme from the perspec-
tive of the offenders.  When employees at banks (and any other public corpo-
ration) commit white-collar crimes, any fine levied against the corporation
31 Id. at 102.
32 Id.
33 See Health Care Fraud, supra note 28.  The “trickle-down theory” is that the benefits
and burdens imposed on corporations will ultimately be passed on to the stakeholders
(including the customers) of that organization.  For an in-depth discussion on the trickle-
down effects of certain regulatory policies, see Rosa Brooks, The Trickle-Down War, 32 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 583 (2014), and Kent Greenfield, Proposition: Saving the World with Corporate
Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 948 (2008).
34 See, e.g., SUSAN P. SHAPIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THINKING ABOUT WHITE COLLAR
CRIME: MATTERS OF CONCEPTUALIZATION AND RESEARCH 42 (1980) (“However, important
characteristics of the nature of illegal activity differ in the contexts of street and white
collar crime.  It has been observed that in the latter, many crimes are victimless or the
parties are unaware of their victimization.”); Colin Goff & Nancy Nason-Clark, Seriousness of
Crime in Fredericton, New Brunswick: Perceptions Toward White-Collar Crime, 31 CAN. J. CRIMI-
NOLOGY 19, 20 (1989) (“In contrast, the public rated white-collar crimes among the least
serious crimes, only marginally higher than victimless crimes and public order offenses.”).
35 White-Collar Crime, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/white-collar-crime (last vis-
ited Oct. 27, 2020).
36 See Brad Foss, Enron, By the Numbers, CBS NEWS (June 15, 2002), https://cbsn.ws/
2NthGa9; Enron, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/enron (last visited Oct.
27, 2020).
37 Levenson, supra note 26.
38 Id.
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will ultimately be passed down and paid by the shareholders.39  This effect
was demonstrated in the Deutsche Bank–Jeffrey Epstein relationship dis-
cussed earlier, where the $150 million fine levied against Deutsche Bank ulti-
mately landed on the public shareholders of the corporation.  Also consider
the 2015 $8.9 billion fine levied against BNP Paribas, discussed in subsection
II.B.1 below.  In its 2014 annual report, BNP Paribas included a financial
statement line item titled “Costs related to the comprehensive settlement
with US authorities.”40  Here, the bank deducted C= 6 billion related to the
fine to calculate its Operating Income.41  In other words, this fine is simply
considered a cost of doing business, ultimately flowing down to Net Income
Attributable to Equity Holders (i.e., the public shareholders).42  The share-
holders are the people who ultimately bear the burden of the fine incurred
by BNP for violating U.S. laws and regulations.43
Not only are the people who make the decisions behind the criminal
activity not the ones who ultimately face the repercussions for their actions
and offenses, but, in most plea agreements, they are also able to remain
nameless.44  Without serious consequences for the specific offenders, the
expected outcome can be determined like any financial decision.  “Since cor-
porate activity is normally undertaken in order to reap some economic bene-
fit, corporate decisionmakers choose courses of action based on a calculation
of potential costs and benefits.”45  To estimate the expected financial impact
of engaging in illegal activity, a potential offender would simply balance the
probability and size of a potential fine with the expected revenue that the
activity would generate.
39 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Punishing Citi, or Its Shareholders?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2010),
https://nyti.ms/2NrBlHl (“[T]ake a step back and ask this question: Who is paying that
$75 million fine?  The answer is Citigroup’s shareholders—the same people who were
arguably defrauded by its failure to disclose its exposure to subprime mortgages in the first
place.”); Dorothy S. Lund & Natasha Sarin, Opinion, Is Corporate Criminal Punishment Just
Another Cost of Doing Business?, REGUL. REV. (July 6, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/
2020/07/06/lund-sarin-corporate-criminal-punishment-another-cost-doing-business/
(“Even if enforcers could levy the optimal fine, the effect would be muted.  Dispersed
shareholders would bear the brunt of the harm, but collective action problems limit their
ability to discipline wayward management.  In other words, the managers who agree to pay
fines out of shareholders’ pockets might not bear any consequences.”); see also J. Strydom,
M. Ward & C. Muller, The Impact of Regulatory Fines on Shareholder Returns, 46 S. AFR. J. BUS.
MGMT. 85, 85 (2015) (examining the impact of regulatory fines on shareholder returns of
public companies).
40 See BNP PARIBAS, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER
2014, at 4 (2015).
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See id. at 46.
44 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 1.
45 Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 1227, 1235 (1979) [hereinafter Regulating Corporate Behavior]. But see Brent Fisse,
Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1141, 1154–59 (1983).
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As a result, corporations simply factor the cost of white-collar crime into
the cost of doing business.  The disadvantage of the potential fine levied
against the corporation would be further mitigated by diffusing the burden
across all shareholders.  These fines, which are issued with the purpose of
deterring criminal activity, are dulled into a simple cost of doing business.
Banks, deciding whether or not to engage in forbidden behavior think that
(1) the chance of getting caught is low, (2) if they get caught, the financial
regulatory fine will ultimately fall to shareholders, and (3) in that event, the
cost is distributed across billions of shares.  These costs are weighed against
the enormous potential revenues that the banks stand to make from allowing
illicit transactions to occur.  With the benefit of such activity (the revenues)
outweighing the potential financial burden, the current regulatory scheme’s
approach of levying fines against large banks is ultimately dulled into a sim-
ple risk-reward analysis for corporations.  Since these fines are not paid by
those who committed the illegal act but are instead dispersed amongst all
shareholders, the criminal benefits currently outweigh the regulatory costs.
C. A Dual System of Justice
Time and time again, the failure to effectively regulate the criminal
behavior that produces such significant societal costs negatively impacts soci-
etal trust in both our financial institutions and the criminal justice system.  A
system of justice works only if those subject to it have faith in its design and
execution.  Sociologists have emphasized that white-collar crimes are particu-
larly harmful to society because they are committed by those in positions of
power, those to whom society looks to behave responsibly and set a moral
example.46  Therefore, in addition to the financial costs suffered by society,
treating white-collar crime differently from regular “street” crime has the dis-
paraging effect of establishing that all people are not viewed as equals in the
eyes of the law, a concept ingrained within our criminal justice system.  Not
only is such inequality fundamentally discriminatory, but the resulting loss of
the public’s faith in the criminal justice system also significantly impairs its
functionality.
Consider the sentencing of Paul Manafort in 2018.  Manafort was tried
in the Eastern District of Virginia on eighteen charges, including bank fraud,
failing to disclose foreign bank accounts, and tax evasion.47  Manafort was
not the initial target of a white-collar investigation, but rather, these crimes
were uncovered during Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s “unrelated” investi-
gation into Russia’s interference with the 2016 presidential election.48  Mr.
Manafort was convicted of five counts of tax fraud, two counts of bank fraud,
46 See Robert F. Meier & James F. Short, Jr., The Consequences of White-Collar Crime, in
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH 23, 27–29 (Herbert Edelhertz & Thomas
D. Overcast, eds., 1982).
47 United States v. Manafort, 321 F. Supp. 3d 640, 649 (E.D. Va. 2018).
48 Id. at 646, 650.
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and one count of failure to disclose a foreign bank account.49  A mistrial was
issued on the remaining ten counts after the jury was unable to reach a ver-
dict.50  After “evaluating all of his options,” Manafort entered into a plea deal
with prosecutors in which he agreed to forfeit approximately $22 million in
real estate.51  Under the terms of the deal, in addition to the forfeitures, Mr.
Manafort agreed to cooperate with the Special Counsel’s investigation.52
Specifically, the arrangement required him to answer questions about “any
and all matters” “fully, truthfully, completely and forthrightly.”53  To make
matters worse, five months later, a federal judge ruled that Manafort had
breached his plea agreement by lying “multiple times” to federal prosecu-
tors.54  In sentencing, citing the federal sentencing guidelines, prosecutors
recommended nineteen-and-a-half to twenty-four years in prison.  Instead,
Manafort received less than four years in prison, a fine of $50,000, and resti-
tution of just over $24 million.55  While noting Manafort’s “otherwise blame-
less” life, Judge T. S. Ellis III “was surprised not [to] hear [Manafort] express
regret for engaging in wrongful conduct.”56  Judge Ellis’s prison sentence,
however, was even less than the one recommended by Manafort’s own law-
yers, which was in the range of four-and-a-quarter to five-and-a-quarter
years.57  To many, Paul Manafort’s sentence provided the prototypical exam-
ple of the dual system of justice that white-collar criminal enforcement had
created.
Manafort’s plea agreement immediately drew an intense and negative
reaction.  As noted by Democratic Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cor-
tez, “Paul Manafort getting such little jail time for such serious crimes lays out
for the world how it’s almost impossible for rich people to go to jail for the
same amount of time as someone who is lower income.  In our current bro-
ken system, ‘justice’ isn’t blind.  It’s bought.”58  A former attorney with the
U.S. Sentencing Commission remarked that “Manafort’s sentence was less
than half of what people who plead guilty and cooperate with the govern-
49 Sharon LaFraniere, Paul Manafort, Trump’s Former Campaign Chairman, Guilty of 8
Counts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2018), https://nyti.ms/38O6mfZ.
50 Id.
51 Id.; see Julia Jacobs, Paul Manafort Forfeits $22 Million in New York Real Estate in Plea
Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2018), https://nyti.ms/3bXPyFG.
52 See Sharon LaFraniere & Kenneth P. Vogel, Paul Manafort Agrees to Cooperate with
Special Counsel; Pleads Guilty to Reduced Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2018), https://
nyti.ms/3eQoTfN.
53 Id. (quoting Plea Agreement at 6, United States v. Manafort, No. 1:17-CR-00201-ABJ
(D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), ECF No. 422).
54 See Sharon LaFraniere, Manafort Lied After Plea Deal, Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13,
2019), https://nyti.ms/3vx56rH.
55 Sarah N. Lynch, Andy Sullivan & Jan Wolfe, U.S. Judge Gives Trump Ex-Aide Manafort
Leniency: Under Four Years in Prison, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2019), https://reut.rs/30SWFIX.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@AOC), TWITTER (Mar. 7, 2019, 9:42 PM), https://twit
ter.com/AOC/status/1103848541443817472.
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ment typically get in similar cases.”59  Laurence Tribe, Professor Emeritus of
Constitutional Law at Harvard Law School, specifically commented on the
considerations that the federal judge took into account when determining
Manafort’s sentence.  “Judge Ellis’s assessment that Manafort led an ‘other-
wise blameless life’ was proof that he’s unfit to serve on the federal bench.
I’ve rarely been more disgusted by a judge’s transparently preferential treat-
ment to a rich white guy who betrayed the law and the nation.”60  Rebecca
Kavanagh, a criminal defense and civil rights attorney, commented, “The
prosecutor in Paul Manafort’s case recommended a [nineteen] to [twenty-
five] year prison sentence.  Judge Ellis just sentenced him to under [four]
years.  Judges almost never sentence my clients to less prison time than prose-
cutors recommend.  Compassion is a quality shown only to some.”61  Each of
these comments represents the losing of faith in the criminal justice system as
a result of the disparate administration of justice expressed to some white-
collar criminals.
Senator Ron Wyden, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee,
sensed this disparate enforcement to be a theme within the current state of
corporate white-collar criminal enforcement.  To him, current enforcement
“reinforces the fact that we now have two systems of law enforcement and
justice in the country. . . . If you’re wealthy and well-connected, you can fig-
ure out how to do an enormous amount of harm to society at large and
ensure that it accrues to enormous financial benefit for . . . you.”62 Other
observers have commented that while “[d]rug cartels move millions through
[U.S.] banks; poor people go to jail for possession.”63
II. EVALUATING THE CURRENT EFFECTIVENESS OF CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
A. The Response to HSBC’s “Pervasive” Failures
In 2012, a subcommittee within the U.S. Senate issued a report detailing
and evaluating the vulnerabilities of the U.S.’s current response to money
laundering, drugs, and terrorist financing, specifically through the case
example of HSBC.64  HSBC’s wrongdoings were clear.  According to the
59 Lynch et al., supra note 55.
60 Laurence Tribe (@tribelaw), TWITTER (Mar. 7, 2019, 7:16 PM), https://twitter.com/
tribelaw/status/1103811760501522432.
61 Rebecca Kavanagh (@DrRJKavanagh), TWITTER (Mar. 7, 2019, 7:08 PM), https://
twitter.com/DrRJKavanagh/status/1103809627869843456.
62 Jason Leopold et al., The FinCEN Files, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 20, 2020) [hereinafter
The FinCEN Files], https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jasonleopold/fincen-files-finan-
cial-scandal-criminal-networks.
63 Id.
64 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS, 112TH CONG., U.S. VUL-
NERABILITIES TO MONEY LAUNDERING, DRUGS, AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HSBC CASE HIS-
TORY (Comm. Print 2012).  The report specifically focused on five main areas of abuse: (1)
servicing high risk affiliates even though red flags indicated proceeds contained illegal
drug sales in the United States; (2) actively circumventing U.S. safeguards designed to
block transactions involving terrorists, drug lords, and rogue regimes; (3) disregarding
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report, HSBC had helped a Saudi bank with links to al-Qaeda launder and
transfer money into the United States, laundered billions of dollars for Mexi-
can drug cartels, and violated U.S. economic sanctions by doing business with
Syria, Sudan, and Iran.65  Based on the evidence received by the congres-
sional committee, federal wiretaps overheard drug lords of the Sinaloa cartel,
who were responsible for tens of thousands of murders, recommend HSBC as
“the place to bank.”66   The committee’s report described how HSBC’s “sys-
temic weaknesses” led to these offenses and how their failures were not
merely individual one-off shortcomings.67
Senator Carl Levin, chairman of the report’s subcommittee, stated that
HSBC was “pervasively polluted” and “used its U.S. bank as a gateway into the
U.S. financial system . . . while playing fast and loose with U.S. banking
rules.”68  HSBC serves as “a major conduit for illicit money flows unless U.S.
laws to prevent money laundering are followed.”69  Although it was clear that
HSBC’s transgressions were severe, the ultimate sentence HSBC received is
an example of what many corporate white-collar criminal offenders have
become accustomed to.  No criminal charges were filed.  No executives were
indicted for turning a willful blind eye toward money laundering, drug traf-
ficking, and terrorist financing.  Instead, the Justice Department made sure
that HSBC was “held accountable for stunning failures of oversight—and
worse—that led the bank to permit narcotics traffickers and others to laun-
der hundreds of millions of dollars through HSBC subsidiaries, and to facili-
tate hundreds of millions more in transactions with sanctioned countries” by
entering into a DPA and fining them $1.256 billion.70  This fine was about
the equivalent of three weeks’ profit for the bank.71
In 2015, the DOJ released the “Yates Memo,” issued by former Deputy
Attorney General Sally Yates, which highlighted a series of policy changes
that would result in individual accountability for corporate wrongdoing.72
terrorist financing links; (4) clearing obviously suspicious bulk travelers checks; and (5)
offering bearer share corporations accounts despite the high risk of money laundering. Id.
65 Id. at 7, 38, 115.
66 Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
67 Id. at 58, 86.
68 HSBC Exposed U.S. Financial System to Money Laundering, Drug, Terrorist Financing




70 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A.
Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanction Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in
Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-
holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-money-laundering-and-sanctions-violations.
71 In 2012, HSBC’s global profit before taxation was $20,649 million.  HSBC, ANNUAL
REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2012, at 2 (2013).  On average, in three weeks, the bank earned a
profit of $1.19 billion. See id.
72 Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to All
Component Heads and U.S. Att’ys (Sept. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Yates Memorandum],
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download; see also New DOJ Guidance
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The DOJ’s new policy would emphasize the identification of the culpable
individuals in corporate individual investigations, while also instituting a
strict cooperation credit policy that would require corporations to provide all
relevant facts about the individuals involved in corporate misconduct to
receive any cooperation credit in civil and criminal cases.73  In support of this
updated recommendation, Yates cited multiple reasons for identifying indi-
vidual wrongdoers: “[I]t deters future illegal activity, it incentivizes changes
in corporate behavior, it ensures that the proper parties are held responsible
for their actions, and it promotes the public’s confidence in our justice sys-
tem.”74  In 2018, however, Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein stated
that the DOJ would take a step back from the rigid approach set forth in the
Yates Memo because “the policy was not strictly enforced in some cases
because it would have impeded resolutions and wasted resources.”75  Mr.
Rosenstein announced that the policy would be revised “to restore some of
the discretion that civil attorneys traditionally exercised.”76  The future of the
Yates Memo is uncertain,77 and Mr. Rosenstein’s remarks could imply that
the DOJ is returning to a more “business-friendly” enforcement.78
B. Achieving Criminal Law’s Fundamental Objectives
Punishment generally has five recognized justifications and purposes:
deterrence (both specific and general), incapacitation, rehabilitation, restitu-
tion, and retribution.79  In the area of corporate white-collar crime, observers
sometimes claim that deterrence is the only relevant objective.80  However,
Puts Emphasis on Identifying Culpable Individuals in Corporate Internal Investigations, SIDLEY
(Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2015/09/new-doj-
guidance-puts-emphasis-on-identifying.
73 Yates Memorandum, supra note 72.
74 Id.
75 Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks at the American Conference Insti-




77 See Patrick F. Linehan, Galen Kast & Elizabeth Pericak Ginsburg, What Lies Ahead for
the Yates Memo?, 5 PRATT’S GOV’T CONTRACTING L. REP. 201 (2019).
78 See id. at 204; see also Gideon Mark, The Yates Memorandum, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1589, 1605 (2018); DOJ Announces Important Changes to Yates Memo, SIDLEY (Nov. 30, 2018),
https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2018/11/doj-announces-important-
changes-to-yates-memo.
79 See generally Fisse, supra note 45 (discussing the justifications of punishment in the
context of corporate criminal law); see also STANTON WHEELER, KENNETH MANN & AUSTIN
SARAT, SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 10 (1988)
(“[S]ome minimal consensus on the legitimate purposes of sentencing has been reached—
the usual litany includes deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and some form of
either ‘desert’ or ‘retribution.’”).
80 Fisse, supra note 45, at 1146 (of “the traditional utilitarian aims of individual crimi-
nal law, . . . deterrence is the only one that is important in corporate criminal law”); see also
Regulating Corporate Behavior, supra note 45, at 1236.
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trends show that merely focusing on deterrence, particularly through the ave-
nue of regulatory fines, is unsuccessful.81  Therefore, a more holistic outlook
claims that “a broader view of the goals of corporate criminal law should be
adopted” in order to attain the goal of effectively combatting white-collar
crime.82  As the existing prosecutorial scheme currently functions, these
broader objectives are not met.
1. General Deterrence
One of the primary justifications for imposing a punishment on a crimi-
nal is that it will deter both the defendant and others from engaging in
future criminal acts because the cost of committing a crime will exceed the
benefit.  General deterrence is the imposition of a punishment that serves “to
discourage people from committing crime.”83  It is the idea that when an
observer reads the newspaper and sees the punishment that John Q. Public
received for committing a certain crime, they would think to themselves, “I
am never going to do that.”  This justification is often cited by judges when
conferring punishments on defendants.
Take, for example, the sentencing of a defendant who conducted the
largest private Ponzi scheme in history.  According to charging documents,
based on the amounts in the accounts of the firm’s 4800 clients, the fraud’s
size was estimated at around $64.8 billion.  Prosecutors recommended a sen-
tence of fifty years, which would effectively serve as a life sentence for the
seventy-one-year-old man.  The judge disregarded the prosecutor’s recom-
mendation and sentenced the defendant to the statutory maximum: 150
years behind bars.  That defendant was Bernie Madoff.84
When imposing the sentence, Judge Denny Chin referenced the deter-
rent effect the punishment would have on the public, highlighting the sen-
tence’s importance to others.85  “[T]he strongest possible message must be
sent to those who would engage in similar conduct that they will be caught
and that they will be punished to the fullest extent of the law.”86  If the mes-
sage is received by its intended audience, “then deterrence provides a mean-
ingful avenue to ensure that punishments reflect the judicial goal of
81 Fisse, supra note 45, at 1243; see Peter J. Henning, Is Deterrence Relevant in Sentencing
White-Collar Criminals?, 61 WAYNE L. REV. 27, 27–29 (2015).
82 Fisse, supra note 45, at 1145.
83 General Deterrence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
84 See Robert Frank, Amir Efrati, Aaron Lucchetti & Chad Bray, Madoff Jailed After
Admitting Epic Scam, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB123685693449906551; Martha Graybow, Madoff Mysteries Remain as He Nears Guilty Plea,
REUTERS (Mar. 11, 2009), https://reut.rs/2NraRpq; Diana B. Henriques, U.S. Proposes 150
Years for Madoff, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2009), https://nyti.ms/30U49vu.
85 Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 47, United States v. Madoff, No. 09-CR-213
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2009) [hereinafter Madoff Sentencing], https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/usao-sdny/legacy/2012/04/16/20090629sentencingtranscriptcorrected.pdf.
86 Id.
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preventing future crimes regardless of whether there is any real impact on
those who might succumb to the temptation to commit a crime.”87
The argument for imposing fines as punishment for corporate white-
collar misconduct is that the nonfinancial impact of such fines on the com-
pany’s image, brand, and reputation would deter others from committing
similar crimes.88  However, because of the widespread negative publicity
across the entire financial sector, the brand impact on major financial institu-
tions is nominal.  One would be hard-pressed to find a major bank that has
not engaged in criminal behavior similar to that in the examples of Deutsche
Bank and HSBC provided above.  Take, for example, the brand and image of
BNP Paribas, the world’s ninth-largest bank by assets.89  In 2014, the bank
was investigated for their involvement in a massive money laundering
scheme.90  BNP Paribas actively concealed its transactions for clients in
Sudan, Iran, and Cuba, countries on which the United States placed eco-
nomic sanctions.91  BNP Paribas served as the “central bank for the govern-
ment of Sudan,” and concealed its activity in order to avoid detection.92  BNP
actively “stripp[ed] information from wire transfers so they could pass
through the U.S. system without raising red flags.”93  As a result of this behav-
ior, BNP paid a fine of $8.9 billion to regulators.94  One would think that
such behavior would shock the public and destroy the community’s faith in
the bank.  Instead, business went on as usual.  In fact, excluding the fine, the
bank’s net income rose 8% from 2014 to 2015 and 15.2% from 2015 to
2016.95  BNP’s stock price tells a similar story.  Although the stock fell when
news of the fine initially broke, the stock price fully recovered and ended up
rising 21.8% from the beginning of 2015 to the end of 2016, compared to the
87 Henning, supra note 81, at 32–33.
88 See, e.g., John Armour, Colin Mayer & Andrea Polo, Regulatory Sanctions and Reputa-
tional Damage in Financial Markets, 52 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1429, 1429 (2017)
(“We find that reputational losses are nearly nine times the size of fines.”); Thomas
Sehested, Compliance Can Make or Break Your Company’s Reputation, FORBES (July 10, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/07/10/compliance-can-make-or-
break-your-companys-reputation/.
89 See Zarmina Ali, The World’s 100 Largest Banks, 2020, S&P GLOB. MKT. INTEL. (Apr. 7,
2020), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-head
lines/the-world-s-100-largest-banks-2020-57854079.
90 See Jennifer Rankin, BNP Paribas Braced for $8.9bn Fine, THE GUARDIAN (June 30,
2014), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jun/30/bnp-paribas-fine-us-justice-
department.
91 Id.; Nate Raymond, BNP Paribas Sentenced in $8.9 Billion Accord over Sanctions Viola-
tions, REUTERS (May 1, 2015), https://reut.rs/3cNevm6.
92 Raymond, supra note 91.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 See BNP PARIBAS, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER
2015 (2016); BNP PARIBAS, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: YEAR ENDED 31 DECEM-
BER 2016 (2017).
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S&P’s gain of only 9.5% in that same timeframe.96  BNP’s nonfinancial brand
image appeared to be relatively unimpaired as well.  In 2015, the same year
the fine was incurred, BNP Paribas served as the official sponsor of the
French Open, one of the most prestigious Grand Slam tournaments.97
Although BNP was paying billions of dollars in fines to U.S. regulators for
doing business with sanctioned countries, the bank’s logo was prominently
displayed under the lights at Roland-Garros.98
Furthermore, from a public image perspective, agreeing to pay a fine for
alleged wrongdoing is more preferable to the bank than being forced to draw
out an uncertain and embarrassing extended trial.  “Large corporations have
demonstrated a willingness to pay eye-popping sums, at [their] shareholders’
expense.”99  This principle makes sense for “[p]rosecutors with limited
resources, no matter how dedicated to justice they may be.”100  Prosecutors
“can’t ignore the attractions of such negotiated settlements: more headlines,
more money for victims and federal coffers, less risk of failure, and better
statistics with which to impress bosses and potential employers in the private
sector.”101  However, such agreements protect banks from the bad publicity
that might occur if they were instead prosecuted.  “If executives can buy
impunity using shareholders’ money, punishment loses its deterrent
effect.”102  As such, more severe action must be taken to ensure the general
deterrent effect of white-collar criminal enforcement is met.
2. Specific Deterrence, Incapacitation, and Rehabilitation of the Offender
Specific deterrence, in contrast with general deterrence, “pertains to the
effects of the legal punishment on those who have suffered it.”103  In other
words, specific deterrence has the goal of discouraging the person who com-
mitted the wrongdoing from committing it again in the future.  Incapacita-
tion seeks to prohibit the wrongdoer from performing future wrongful acts,
whereas rehabilitation focuses on the reformation and restoration of the
criminal offender.  For the purposes of corporate white-collar crimes, since
each of these justifications is focused on the individual offender, the objec-
tives of specific deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation go hand in
hand.  Together, these justifications hope to achieve the ultimate objective of
96 BNP Paribas SA (BNP.PA), YAHOO! FIN., https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/BNP.PA
(last visited Nov. 4, 2020).
97 See French Open Serves up Renewal with Main Sponsor, SPORTBUSINESS SPONSORSHIP
(Feb. 14, 2017), https://sponsorship.sportbusiness.com/news/french-open-serves-up-
renewal-with-main-sponsor/.
98 Id.





103 Mark C. Stafford & Mark Warr, A Reconceptualization of General and Specific Deterrence,
30 J. RSCH. CRIM. & DELINQ. 123, 123 (1993).
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reducing the criminal’s future misconduct.104  The current approach to
white-collar criminal enforcement of banks does not adequately achieve any
of these justifications.
In corporate white-collar crime, there are two “individuals” that punish-
ment is intended to deter: the corporation and the individual.  Levying huge
fines against banks fails on both counts.  As discussed earlier, consider the
recidivism rates of major banks, this time viewed through the lens of J.P.
Morgan Chase.  Within the last two decades, the bank paid over $135 million
in fines for aiding and abetting Enron’s securities fraud;105 $410 million in
penalties for illegal manipulation of the energy market;106 $5.3 million to
settle allegations that it violated Cuban Assets Control Regulations, Iranian
sanctions, and Weapons of Mass Destruction sanctions;107 and $135 million
for charges of improper handling of “pre-released” American depository
receipts.108  The list goes on and on.  If J.P. Morgan’s “rap sheet” was that of
an individual offender, the DOJ would surely design a punishment that
deters and prohibits the offender from conducting future wrongdoing.
Current punishment schemes are just as ineffective in deterring the indi-
vidual actors who commit the wrongdoing.  Banks go to great lengths to
shield their corporate executives, choosing to “happily pay a big fine as long
as senior managers are protected.”109  By using DPAs, banks agree to pay
large fines, to which prosecutors, in return, agree not to file official charges.
In such cases, “it is difficult for a prosecutor ever to justify the release of the
evidence which might suggest wrongdoing.”110  With banks regularly agree-
ing to pay such fines in order to forgo criminal charges, the individual
offenders often remain shrouded behind a cloud of anonymity.
After the exposure and fine of Deutsche Bank’s illicit relationship with
Jeffrey Epstein, the bank “declined to publicly identify any individuals
involved—and the authorities didn’t demand it.”111  The consent order that
was made available to the public used references like “RELATIONSHIP
104 See Richard S. Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences Under Federal and State Constitu-
tions, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 39, 43 (2008).
105 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges J.P. Morgan Chase in Con-
nection with Enron’s Accounting Fraud  (July 28, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/lr18252.htm.
106 See Scott DiSavino, JPMorgan to Pay $410 Million to Settle Power Market Case, REUTERS
(July 30, 2013), https://reut.rs/3eX6zSh.
107 Pete Schroeder, J.P. Morgan to Settle Allegations of Violating Sanctions: U.S. Treasury,
REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2018), https://reut.rs/2QhViBC.
108 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, JPMorgan to Pay More Than $135 Million
for Improper Handling of ADRs (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/
2018-306.
109 Stewart, supra note 1.
110 Jack Katz, Legality and Equality: Plea Bargaining in the Prosecution of White-Collar and
Common Crimes, 13 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 431, 457 n.17 (1979) (quoting Richard L. Thorn-
burgh, Assistant Att’y Gen., Address to the State Bar of Wisconsin at Its Annual Meeting
(June 18, 1976)).
111 Stewart, supra note 1.
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MANAGER-1 and EXECUTIVE-2” to identify the guilty culprits.112  However,
through the use of investigative techniques, the New York Times was able to
identify the previously unnamed parties.113  While offenders across the crimi-
nal spectrum face irreparable injury from punishments they receive, the indi-
viduals behind Deutsche Bank’s $150 million fine went largely unharmed.
One offender, Jan Ford, Deutsche Bank’s head of compliance in the Ameri-
cas, even remained in her position with the bank, despite her hands-on
involvement in Mr. Epstein’s relationship with the bank.114  Paul Morris, the
relationship manager who brought Epstein into the bank, went to work as a
private wealth adviser at Merrill Lynch.115  Charles Packard, the head of the
bank’s American wealth-management division and the supervisor of Mr. Mor-
ris, went on to join Bridgewater Associates, the hedge fund founded by Ray
Dalio.116  By avoiding personal responsibility and accountability, such execu-
tives remained undeterred, unprohibited, and unrehabilitated from commit-
ting future wrongdoing.
3. Restitution
The next justification for punishment is the restoration of the victims.
Judge Chin, when sentencing Bernie Madoff to 150 years imprisonment,
highlighted the symbolic importance of the severe term for the victims.117  In
Madoff’s case, the victims included individuals from “all walks of life,” com-
prised of charities and academic institutions, pension funds and retirement
accounts, the rich, and the not-so-rich.118  The detrimental and widespread
cost of white-collar crime is severe, and it has the ability to leave victims devas-
tated.  In the instances of white-collar crimes that are traceable to the injured
victims, restitution is, generally, adequately satisfied.  A significant percent-
age of the fines levied against the banks goes to the restitution of the victims
who were harmed by those actions, as long as those victims are identifi-
able.119  However, restitution becomes much more challenging when victims





116 Id.  Bridgewater’s firm culture has been likened to that of a cult, one where employ-
ees, under Dalio’s insistence, should do “whatever it takes to make the company great.”
Stefan Stern, Opinion, Time to Toughen Up and Embrace the Joys of Conflict, FIN. TIMES (Jan.
14, 2008), https://on.ft.com/2ONeF4Z; see John Cassidy, Mastering the Machine, NEW
YORKER (July 18, 2011), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/07/25/mastering-
the-machine.
117 Madoff Sentencing, supra note 85, at 47–49.
118 Id. at 47.
119 See, e.g., Jeff Blumenthal, TD Bank Fined $122M for Enrolling Customers in Overdraft
Service Without Consent, PHILA. BUS. J. (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.bizjournals.com/phila-
delphia/news/2020/08/20/td-bank-fined-122m-for.html; North American Banks Pay High
Price for Governance Failings, FITCHRATINGS (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.fitchratings.com/
research/banks/north-american-banks-pay-high-price-for-governance-failings-29-10-2020.
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those that are “directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission
of an offense.”120  The complication in white-collar cases, as described ear-
lier, is that it is difficult to trace the behavior of large international corporate
financial fraud to the individuals that were personally harmed.
Consider, for example, health care fraud in the form of upcoding, pro-
viding unnecessary services, or charging patients for phantom services not
provided.121  The ultimate harm suffered by these offenses can take the form
of increased health care premiums, more expensive employer-provided
health coverage plans, and the deteriorating quality of health care cover-
age.122  These harms are extreme when considering the prevalence of such
crimes across the nation, but they can be attenuated and difficult to assign to
individual defendants.  Imagine the DOJ was able to prove, beyond a reasona-
ble doubt, that health care coverage across the country is more expensive
and lower in quality because of one instance of such a crime.  It would be a
significant leap from there to assign this widespread harm to one individual
defendant.
Additionally, courts will generally award restitution only in cases with
monetary damages.  The damages of societal loss of faith in our judicial sys-
tem or the harm indirectly caused by the deterioration of health care cover-
age would be difficult to monetize in the form of harm suffered by an
individual victim.  Moreover, if restitution were the only justification of pun-
ishment adequately met, without the elements of deterrence, incapacitation,
or rehabilitation, the criminal behavior is likely to recur and continue harm-
ing victims again in the future.
4. Retribution
Retribution is the traditional notion of punishment that a criminal must
be punished in proportion to their blameworthiness, or their “moral desert.”
Retributivism, as a principle of punishment, traces its roots to Immanuel
Kant’s The Metaphysics of Morals, written in 1785.123 Retribution was another
principle referenced in the sentencing of Bernie Madoff.  When imposing
the 150-year sentence, Judge Chin stated that “the message must be sent that
Mr. Madoff’s crimes were extraordinarily evil, and that this kind of irresponsi-
ble manipulation of the system is not merely a bloodless financial crime that
takes place on paper, but that it is instead, . . . one that takes a staggering
human toll.”124  He went on to state that “[t]he symbolism is important
because the message must be sent that in a society governed by the rule of
120 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) (2018) (emphasis added).
121 See supra Section I.A.
122 Id.
123 Guyora Binder, Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 321, 350
(2002); see IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (John Ladd trans., Hackett
Publ’g Co. 2d ed. 1999).
124 Madoff Sentencing, supra note 85, at 47.
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law, Mr. Madoff will get what he deserves, and that he will be punished accord-
ing to his moral culpability.”125
Retribution in many white-collar cases, however, does not look like the
story of Bernie Madoff.  Compare this to the story of another white-collar
criminal, Ty Warner.  Warner founded the company that sold “Beanie
Babies,” the plush toys that swept the nation in the late 1990s.126  In 2013,
Mr. Warner pleaded guilty to tax evasion, using a hidden Swiss bank account
to evade over $5 million in taxes.127  While the prosecutor recommended a
prison sentence, the judge imposed no jail time.  Instead, the judge delivered
a modest probationary period, community service, and a fine that was less
than two percent of the amount he evaded in taxes.128  In his sentencing, the
judge pointed to Mr. Warner’s philanthropic history and “private acts of
kindness.”129  The judge considered “whether society would be better off
with Mr. Warner in jail,” and determined that the world would be better
served from Mr. Warner “utilizing his talents and beneficience [sic]” else-
where.130  The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence.131
At times, however, courts have rejected the premise that a white-collar
criminal deserves less jail time because of their social status.  In another
white-collar case, Matthew Sample pleaded guilty to one count of fraud and
two counts of wire fraud.132  Sample diverted over $1 million from investors
for his personal use.133  Some victims “lost their entire life savings, others
were unable to retire as planned, and many [suffered] profound emotional
distress.”134  The prosecutor’s recommended sentence was between six and
eight years.  Instead, the judge sentenced Mr. Sample to no prison time.  “I
want you to keep your job, because I want you to have a good job to pay these
victims back,” the federal district court judge told the defendant, imposing
instead a five-year term of probation.135  The district judge was not ambigu-
ous about the effect that the defendant’s wealth had on his sentence: “[I]f
Sample did not have his ‘current job and [his] ability to make these pay-
ments, I might be doing something different’ and . . . ‘one of the reasons I’m
125 Id. (emphasis added).
126 See Henning, supra note 81, at 29; Anne Vandermey, Lessons from the Great Beanie
Babies Crash, FORTUNE (Mar. 11, 2015), https://fortune.com/2015/03/11/beanie-babies-
failure-lessons/.
127 Henning, supra note 81, at 29.
128 Id. at 29–30; see Janet Novack, Appeals Court Decides Beanie Babies Billionaire Tax
Evader Ty Warner Won’t Go to Jail, FORBES (July 11, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
janetnovack/2015/07/11/appeals-court-decides-beanie-babies-billionaire-tax-evader-ty-
warner-wont-go-to-jail/?sh=115906b71bb7.
129 Henning, supra note 81, at 30 (quoting Sentencing Hearing Transcript at 50–51,
United States v. Warner, No. 13-CR-731 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2014), ECF No. 33).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 United States v. Sample, 901 F.3d 1196, 1197 (10th Cir. 2018).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1197–98.
135 Id. at 1198.
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willing to place the defendant on probation was because of this job and his
earning capacity.’”136
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit soundly rejected this argument.  “We are
puzzled by the court’s implicit suggestion that if the defendant were poor
and unemployed, he might get a prison term.”137  To support this conten-
tion, the appellate court cited circuits from around the country.138  The
Tenth Circuit highlighted a Seventh Circuit case that noted “[b]usiness
criminals are not to be treated more leniently than members of the ‘criminal
class’ just by virtue of being regularly employed or otherwise productively
engaged in lawful economic activity.”139  Therefore, this appellate court rul-
ing demonstrated that it is critical for enforcement to recognize and account
for the moral desert of the offenders based on retributivist ideals.  Further,
the enforcement should not be modified based on the social class and status
of the offender.
III. REEVALUATING THE TOOLS THAT UNDERMINE EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL
ENFORCEMENT
A. Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs)
It is clear that banks fail to stop the transfer of money that stems from
criminal activity, but, if not even more worrisome, the government is failing
to effectively regulate the banks.  The Financial Crimes Enforcement Net-
work (“FinCEN”) is the government organization within the Department of
Treasury tasked with the safeguarding of the financial system from illicit use,
combatting money laundering, preventing terrorist financing, and
“promot[ing] national security through the strategic use of financial authori-
ties and the collection, analysis, and dissemination of financial intelli-
gence.”140  One of the tools that FinCEN employs to achieve this objective is
the use of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), uniform reports that allow
financial institutions to report suspicious activity to the organization.  When
reporting a transaction, institutions can tag a specific transaction with a cate-
gorical description, such as “Fraud,” “Money Laundering,” “Terrorist Financ-
136 Id. (first alteration in original).
137 Id. at 1199.
138 Id. See, e.g., United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1329 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The
Sentencing Guidelines authorize no special sentencing discounts on account of economic
or social status.”).
139 Sample, 901 F.3d at 1200 (quoting United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1038
(7th Cir. 1999)).  Judges recognize the difficulty in balancing each of these moral justifica-
tions when sentencing. See WHEELER ET AL., supra note 79, at 165 (“In sentencing white-
collar offenders, judges are torn between leniency and severity.  While deterrence pulls
judges in the direction of incarceration, consideration of the effects of incarceration on
the offender and on his immediate social network pulls in the opposite direction.”).
140 Mission, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/about/mission (last
visited Mar. 26, 2021).
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ing,” and/or “Casinos.”141  The quantity of SARs submitted to FinCEN is
enormous.  According to Dynamic Securities Analytics, 2.3 million SARs were
filed in 2019, representing a 6% increase from the previous year.142  Deposi-
tory institutions filed 48% of all SARs.143  In order to incentivize financial
institutions to file SARs, federal laws and FinCEN offer banks immunity for
the subject matter contained in the reports.144  SARs are also rarely released
to the public, but they can become available through the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act.145
In recent news reports, journalists were able to obtain thousands of
SARs, claiming that they offered “an unprecedented view of global financial
corruption, the banks enabling it, and the government agencies that watch as
it flourishes.”146  Specifically, the documents purportedly “expose the hollow-
ness of banking safeguards,” and the ease by which banks can manipulate
their reporting requirements.147  Documents showed that SARs could be
used as a way for banks to appease government regulators while still allowing
for the money underlying those transactions to be moved, which allowed the
bank to collect its fees.148  Examples of the reported transactions include
Standard Chartered moving money on behalf of a Dubai-based business that
was accused of laundering cash for the Taliban;149 Bank of America,
Citibank, J.P. Morgan Chase, American Express, and other banks processing
millions of dollars for the family of Viktor Khrapunov, even after Interpol
issued a Red Notice for his arrest;150 and HSBC allowing WCM777, a Ponzi
141 FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, THE FINCEN SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORT: INTRODUC-
TION & FILING INSTRUCTIONS 11, https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/
TheNewFinCENSAR-RecordedPresentation.pdf.
142 Alison Jimenez, 2019 SAR Insight: Suspicious Activity Report Annual Analysis, DYNAMIC
SEC. ANALYTICS, INC. (Jan. 29, 2020), https://securitiesanalytics.com/2019-sar-insight-suspi-
cious-activity-report-annual-analysis/.
143 Id.
144 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3) (2018) (a financial institution, and its directors, officers,
employees, and agents, that make a disclosure of any possible violation of law or regula-
tion, including in connection with the preparation of suspicious activity reports, “shall not
be liable to any person under any law or regulation of the United States, any constitution,
law, or regulation of any State or political subdivision of any State, or under any contract or
other legally enforceable agreement (including any arbitration agreement), for such dis-
closure or for any failure to provide notice of such disclosure to the person who is the
subject of such disclosure or any other person identified in the disclosure”).
145 See Alex C. Lakatos & Mark G. Hanchet, Confidentiality of Suspicious Activity Reports,
124 BANKING L.J. 794, 795 (2007); see also 31 U.S.C. §§ 5318(g)(2)(A)(i), 5321–22 (2018)
(explaining that SARs cannot be disclosed to anyone and providing sanctions for
violations).




150 Id. Khrapuvnov, the former mayor of Kazakhstan’s most populous city, “was later
convicted in absentia on charges that included bribe-taking and defrauding the city
through the sale of public property.” Id.
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scheme that stole over $80 million from investors, to move more than $15
million in assets.151  The most alarming concern with each of these examples
was not just that the banks allowed the transaction to occur, but that they
allowed them to occur after having received notice (actual or constructive)
that these individuals were persons involved in criminal activity.  Rather than
freezing the transactions, the bank “kept the money moving and kept collect-
ing their fees,” while making sure to file the SARs necessary to comply with
FinCEN’s reporting requirements.152
In response to this exposé, the Bank Policy Institute (BPI) responded by
claiming that the report disregarded the proper use and purpose of SARs.153
Generally, the activity that causes a SAR to be reported to the government
needs only to be “suspicious” and does not reflect any kind of finding by the
bank that criminal activity ensued.  Based on studies BPI has conducted, only
about four percent of SARs result in any follow-up from law enforcement,
which means that closing customer accounts in every instance in which the
bank identifies suspicious activity is untenable.154  Doing so would, over time,
block off an entire part of the world from crucial access to the world’s finan-
cial system.155  Brian Reardon, a former White House official, argues that the
current ineffectiveness of FinCEN Reports are not a reflection of the design
of SARs themselves, but rather how the government is using and analyzing
them.156
One thing is clear: the use of SARs alone is not sufficient to achieve
FinCEN’s purpose and objective.  In a recent report, the Government
Accountability Office recommended that “FinCEN develop policies and pro-
cedures to promote greater law enforcement use of the Bank Secrecy Act
reports.”157  While a step in the right direction, this recommendation should
be strengthened by shifting FinCEN’s current approach of solely relying on
reports submitted by the financial institutions to requiring a higher level of
holistic compliance on the banks’ parts.  This can be achieved by looking to
more than just financial fines as remedies for a bank that fails to effectuate
an adequate internal compliance program.
151 Id. WCM777 “stole at least $80 million from investors, mainly Latino and Asian
immigrants, and the company’s owner used the looted funds to buy two golf courses, a
[7000]-square-foot mansion, a 39.8-carat diamond, and mining rights in Sierra Leone.” Id.
152 Id.





156 Brian Reardon, Opinion, REARDON: Beneficial Ownership and the FinCEN Files, DAILY
CALLER (Sept. 25, 2020), https://dailycaller.com/2020/09/25/reardon-beneficial-owner-
ship-and-the-fincen-files/.
157 Anti–Money Laundering: Opportunities Exist to Increase Law Enforcement Use of Bank
Secrecy Act Reports, and Banks’ Costs to Comply with the Act Varied, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF. (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-574.
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Consider the example of BNP Paribas, mentioned earlier.158  In 2014,
BNP paid a monetary fine of $8.9 billion for failing to prevent billions of
dollars in money laundering transactions.  Even though the fine BNP Paribas
received was considered steep when compared against those levied against
many of their peers, it was still a “discount” when considering the number of
financial transactions BNP allowed.159  When assessing the $8.9 billion fine,
prosecutors cited approximately $30 billion in financial transactions, mean-
ing the fine was less than thirty cents to the dollar of the illicit transactions
that BNP actively stripped identifying information from to avoid detec-
tion.160  Regulators should have sought a much more effective penalty in the
form of temporary license revocation.  “The only penalty that would have
permanently damaged BNP Paribas would have been a ban on clearing dollar
transactions.”161  Even if temporary, it would force BNP to clean up their
procedures in place to detect and deter money laundering.
As is standard in fines across corporate white-collar penalties, the fine
placed on BNP Paribas did not deter future wrongdoing.  In 2017, BNP
Paribas was again fined over weaknesses in anti–money laundering con-
trols.162  This fine was for conduct uncovered during an investigation con-
ducted in 2015, only one year after the $8.9 billion fine was imposed.163
Only two years after 2017 fine, BNP Paribas was again fined for shortcomings
in their anti–money laundering program and supervisory failures.164  When
the financial benefits of doing business as is outweighs the costs of compli-
ance, the current systems in place are unlikely to change.
When the government threatens monetary fines when a bank fails to
effectively execute heightened compliance requirements, banks are happy to
pay the fines if they are less than the cost of compliance.  This is particularly
true if banks can use SARs to acquiesce FinCEN by submitting reports every
time they detect a potentially suspicious transaction, but doing little else.  If
failure of internal controls implementation would carry with it more severe
nonfinancial penalties (such as a ban on clearing dollar transactions), com-
pliance is much more likely to follow.  Such a loss of license would directly
impair a bank’s relationship with customers, and ultimately have a long-term
impact on the institution’s bottom line, a result that current fines do not
have.  By tipping the financial scale in favor of implementing a more effective
158 See supra subsection II.B.1.
159 See Nils Pratley, BNP Paribas’s $8.9bn Fine is Hefty but It’s Still Only a Third of the Dodgy




162 See BNP Paribas Fined over Weaknesses in Anti-Money Laundering Controls, REUTERS
(June 2, 2017), https://reut.rs/30U36f2.
163 See id.
164 See FINRA Fines BNP Paribas $15 Mln for Anti-Money Laundering Program Failures, NAS-
DAQ (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/finra-fines-bnp-paribas-%2415-mln-
for-anti-money-laundering-program-failures-2019-10-24.
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internal control system, banks would be more incentivized to combat the
control failures that result in the financing of crimes all over the world.
B. Deferred Prosecution Agreements
DPAs are contractual agreements between the United States government
(e.g., the DOJ) and a defendant who is facing a criminal or civil charge.165
Under such an agreement, the government agrees to postpone prosecution
to allow the defendant to demonstrate good conduct, cooperation, and
remediation.166  If a defendant complies with the terms of the DPA, the
agency would move to dismiss the relevant charges and not pursue the matter
again.167  DPAs date back to the early 1900s and were used for the purposes
of offering first-time juvenile offenders with no criminal history a method of
obtaining counseling and job-placement programs in lieu of strict prosecu-
tion.168  DPAs for the purpose of handling serious misconduct by corporate
entities and the individuals that run them is a much more recent phenome-
non, however, with the first such DPA signed in 1994.169  Each party’s incen-
tives for entering into a DPA is clear.  The government is able to obtain a
guilty plea and monetary fine while avoiding the significant costs and risks
associated with a long and drawn-out trial.  For the corporation, a DPA also
represents less risk and cost by alleviating the threat of criminal prosecution.
The DOJ hails DPAs as “an important middle ground between declining
prosecution and obtaining the conviction of a corporation.”170  Many other
countries, however, choose not to employ DPAs “because the agreements fail
to adhere to basic rule-of-law principles such as transparency of process, judi-
cial oversight, public interest accountability, and separation-of-powers.”171
While DPAs can be seen as a win-win between the prosecutor and defen-
dant, the loser of such an agreement is the public.  When the government
enters into a DPA, “the government acts as accuser, judge, and jury.”172  In
the white-collar context particularly, DPAs have been criticized for making a
“mockery of [America’s] criminal justice system” when considering the leni-
ent deals being offered to some defendants.173  While there is no easy solu-
tion, there are ways to constructively reform the DPA process.  One solution
165 Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA), Westlaw Glossary (database updated 2021).
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Peter R. Reilly, Sweetheart Deals, Deferred Prosecution, and Making a Mockery of the Crimi-
nal Justice System: U.S. Corporate DPAs Rejected on Many Fronts, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1113, 1115–16
(2018).
169 Id.
170 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.200 (2020), https://
www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations#9-
28.200.
171 Reilly, supra note 168, at 1116.
172 Id. at 1117.
173 Carrick Mollenkamp & Brett Wolf, Exclusive: HSBC Might Pay $1.8 Billion Money
Laundering Fine – Sources, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2012), https://reut.rs/38PJFrU (quoting Jimmy
Gurulé, Professor of Law at Notre Dame Law School).
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is for U.S. Attorneys to become less reliant on DPAs in the enforcement of
white-collar guidelines.  Another, more extreme, solution is to eliminate
DPAs entirely.  Proponents of this solution argue that “[i]f a case is too flimsy
to file charges, [prosecutors should] drop it.”174  The recommendation
below, however, lies somewhere between these two proposals and involves the
role of the judge in the DPA process.
First, it is critical to recognize a key distinction between a DPA and a
regular plea agreement: the approval of the court.  DPAs and plea agree-
ments are similar in many regards.  They provide prosecutors with an alterna-
tive to pursuing trial and are both types of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR).  However, while courts can review plea agreements to evaluate the
sufficiency of their substantive terms, that review is absent in the DPA pro-
cess.175  The current role of courts in the DPA approval process is clear: “[A]
district judge is not permitted to reject the deal due to disagreement with its
substantive terms.”176  One federal district court when discussing its lack of
meaningful judicial review during a DPA approval hearing stated, “I have
absolutely no choice in this matter, no discretion whatsoever . . . .  I’m
obliged to swallow the pill, whether I like it or not.”177  Thus, judges have
been forced to approve DPAs even in instances where it would “provide insuf-
ficient deterrence to companies which otherwise would permit fraud, or fail
to prevent fraud, by its senior officials in the future.”178  This jurisprudence
stems from two federal appellate court rulings: United States v. Fokker Services
B.V. and United States v. HSBC Bank USA.179  Revisiting this rule and homog-
enizing DPA and plea agreements in this manner would strengthen the effec-
tiveness of DPA agreements.  “Congress—or the Judicial Conference, which
drafts changes to the rules of criminal procedure—can give judges specific
powers to ensure that the deals adequately serve the public interest.”180
In plea agreements, judges can, and do, get involved in the substantiality
of the terms of the agreements.  In United States v. Orthofix, Inc., the district
court judge rejected two plea agreements for failing to adequately protect
public interest.181  There, Judge William Young wrote that district courts
174 The Case of the Missing White-Collar Criminal, supra note 99.
175 Reilly, supra note 168, at 1117.
176 Id. at 1122.
177 Id. at 1117 (quoting Arraignment at 10, United States v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 18-cr-150
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2018), ECF No. 9).
178 Id. at 1122–23 (quoting Order at 2, United States v. Transp. Logistics Int’l Inc., No.
18-CR-00011  (D. Md. Apr. 2, 2018), ECF No. 10).
179 Id. at 1128; see also United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir.
2017); United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
180 The Case of the Missing White-Collar Criminal, supra note 99.
181 956 F. Supp. 2d 316, 320 (D. Mass. 2013); see also Reid J. Schar, Robert R. Stauffer,
Tiffany M. Cartwright & Eddie A. Jauregui, Court Rejects Corporate Plea Agreements for Failing
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should take on “a more robust role in protecting the public interest when
deciding whether to accept a corporation’s guilty plea.”182  The order
emphasized  that “[s]entencing offenders is one of the . . . core responsibili-
ties assumed by a federal district judge,” and as such, they must “zealously”
protect the public interest by ensuring that the agreement is not negotiated
in the “shadow of the law.”183  Therefore, when presented with such an
agreement, “the judge is dutybound to consider whether the recommended
sentence would serve the public interest before deciding whether to accept
[it].”184  Judge Young concluded by stating that this responsibility is espe-
cially important when the defendant in question is a corporation.185  This
was because “(1) it is difficult to assess the sincerity and capacity for rehabili-
tation of a corporation whose officers will change over time; and (2) large
corporations have the capacity to ‘wreak far more damage’ than individual
persons.”186
Judges acting as representatives of the public interest is no foreign con-
cept in our judicial system.  For example, by involving the court as a repre-
sentative of the public, the judiciary would serve in a capacity similar to the
one in civil protective orders of documents exchanged by the parties in dis-
covery.  There, the judge may not “rubber stamp” an agreement, even if it is
stipulated by both parties, because the judge serves as “the primary represen-
tative of the public interest in the judicial process and is duty-bound there-
fore to review any request” for good cause.187  The same principle should be
applied to white-collar DPAs.  Since the agreements, as currently designed
and executed, are not achieving their purpose of adequately punishing cor-
porate white-collar criminal conduct, a judge taking on the role as the pro-
tector of public interest would significantly enhance their effectiveness.
CONCLUSION
White-collar crime imposes tremendous and severe costs on our society.
The government’s current approach to the criminal enforcement of financial
institutions is ineffective and fails to adequately address the severity of such
conduct.  By entering into Deferred Prosecution Agreements the govern-
ment is forgoing more effective penalties in exchange for admissions of guilt
and massive fines that makes headlines, thereby failing to accomplish the
fundamental objectives of punishment.  When corporations agree to pay
such fines, it is not the persons responsible for committing the illegal con-
duct who shoulder the burden, but, instead, the burden is dispersed among
hundreds of thousands of innocent public shareholders.  These fines do not
deter the criminal conduct of either individual actors or the financial institu-
182 Schar et al., supra note 181.
183 Orthofix, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 320, 323 (footnote omitted).
184 Id. at 332.
185 Id. at 328–32.
186 Schar et al., supra note 181 (quoting Orthofix, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 331).
187 Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co, 178 F.3d 943, 945 (7th
Cir. 1999).
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tions the fines are levied against.  These fines do not incapacitate or rehabili-
tate offenders.  These fines also do not address the retributive aims of
dispensing punishment based on the offender’s moral desert.
As such, the government should amend its enforcement policies in two
ways.  First, FinCEN should place less emphasis on SARs, which have the abil-
ity to allow banks to file thousands of reports a year without having to address
actual illicit conduct on the part of their clients.  Instead, FinCEN should
require financial institutions to have a holistic internal control system that is
more adequately suited to address client misconduct.  To enforce such a
requirement, FinCEN should also use stricter enforcement penalties such as
the revocation of bank clearing licenses until such internal controls are effec-
tively designed and implemented.  In addition, the judiciary should take on a
more significant role as a representative of public interest in the DPA pro-
cess.  If judges had the ability to substantively review DPAs in this manner,
prosecutors and corporations would be forced to find a sentence that acts in
the best interest of the public.  Implementing these solutions would incen-
tivize financial institutions to more effectively combat white-collar crime and
to deter not only the misconduct on the part of the banks, but also the
crimes that these transactions fund around the world.
